The present document describes the main communication resources involved in a QKD system and the possible architectures that can be adopted when performing a QKD deployment over an optical network infrastructure. The scope of the present document is restricted to QKD deployments over fibre optical networks. Architectural options are also restricted to point-to-point communication.
The present document gives specifications and procedures for the characterization of optical components for use in QKD systems. Examples of specific tests and procedures for performing such tests are given. Due to their importance in the security of a QKD system, particular attention is given to active optical components such as optical sources and single photon detectors.
The present document is intended to specify an Application Programming Interface (API) between a QKD key manager and applications. The function of a QKD key manager is to manage the secure keys produced by an implementation of a QKD protocol and to deliver the identical set of keys, via this API, to the associated applications at the communication end points.
The Use Cases Document shall provide an overview of possible application scenarios in which Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems ([i.1]) can be used as building blocks for high security Information and communication technology (ICT) systems.
The present document gives information on the long-term suitability of symmetric cryptographic primitives in the face of quantum computing.
The present document presents the results of a simplified threat assessment following the guidelines of ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.3] for a number of use cases. The method and key results of the analysis is described in clause 4. The present document makes a number of assumptions regarding the timescale for the deployment of viable quantum computers, however the overriding assertion is that quantum computing will become viable in due course. This is examined in more detail in clause 5. The impact of quantum computing attacks on the cryptographic deployments used in a number of existing industrial deployment scenarios are considered in clause 7.
The present document examines a number of real-world uses cases for the deployment of quantum-safe cryptography (QSC). Specifically, it examines some typical applications where cryptographic primitives are deployed today and discusses some points for consideration by developers, highlighting features that may need change to accommodate quantum-safe cryptography. The main focus of the document is on options for upgrading public-key primitives for key establishment and authentication, although several alternative, non-public-key options are also discussed.
The present document gives an overview of the current understanding and best practice in academia and industry about quantum-safe cryptography (QSC). It focuses on identifying and assessing cryptographic primitives that have been proposed for efficient key establishment and authentication applications, and which may be suitable for standardization by ETSI and subsequent use by industry to develop quantum-safe solutions for real-world applications.
The specific purpose of this protocol is to validate the safety skill “limit interaction energy” by measurement for robotic grippers. In this context, the skill “limit interaction energy” is commonly used to protect workers from injuries caused by clamping and squeezing of body parts by the closing gripper. The validation of this protocol requires that the reader has a bio-fidelic measurement instrument available to measure contact forces and pressures.
This DGUV Information is intended in particular for practitioners in the company who wish to find out about the hazards and safe handling of industrial robots. It outlines the most important safety-related features of industrial robots. It also addresses the most important requirements from the currently applicable legal sources and prepares them in a practical manner. It is intended to provide quick access to all aspects to be considered in the planning, acceptance, monitoring and operation of industrial robots and industrial robot systems.
The BG/BGIA recommendations for the risk assessment according to the machinery directive are published by the – German Institutions for Statutory Accident Insurance and – the Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BGIA). Their objective is to provide companies an aid for the accident prevention related part of risk assessment. These BG/BGIA recommendations were drawn up in collaboration with the – Expert Committee for Machine Construction, Production Systems and Steel Construction of the Institution for Statutory Accident Insurance and Prevention Metall Nord Süd (Fachausschuss Maschinenbau, Fertigungssysteme, Stahlbau der Berufsgenossenschaft Metall Nord Süd).
Provides Stage 1 normative service requirements for 5G systems, in particular service requirements for cyber-physical control applications in vertical domains. cyberphysical systems understood as systems that include engineered, interacting networks of physical and computational components; control applications are to be understood as applications that control physical processes. The requirements of relevance to robotics, e.g. Mobile Robots are discussed, including impact to Factories of the Future