Identification of use cases for visually impaired people for e-access to ICT products and services but also use cases to allow users to interact with machines or equipment (e.g. users terminal, user interface) via dedicated devices (M2M communications) in order to define appropriate protocols (NFC or similar)
The intention is not to define technical solutions but to forward the requirements to the appropriate TBs
This standard defines a suite of cryptographic protocols supporting the protection of Electric Power System communications links. It does not address specific applications or hardware implementations, and is independent of the underlying communications protocol.
This guide describes recommended practices for the physical security of electric power substations. It is designed to address a number of threats, including unauthorized access to substation facilities, theft of material, and vandalism. It describes options for positive access control, monitoring of facilities, and delay/deter features which could be employed to mitigate these threats. This guide also establishes options for different levels of physical security for electric power substations. The guide does not establish recommendations based on voltage levels, size or any depiction of criticality of the substation. The user will make these decisions based on threat assessment and criticality assignment by the substation owner. Overt attacks against the substation for the purpose of destroying its capability to operate, such as explosives, projectiles, vehicles, etc. are beyond the scope of this guide.
The objective of Recommendation ITU-T Y.4119 is to identify requirements of an Internet of things (IoT)-based automotive emergency response system (AERS) for aftermarket devices and to provide a capability framework of the AERS.In particular, the scope of this Recommendation includes:– Overview of the AERS– Requirements of the AERS– Capability framework of the AERSAERS for original equipment manufacturer (OEM) pre-installed devices, such as the pan-European eCall [b-CEN EN 16072], is out of scope of this Recommendation.NOTE – AERS can be considered as a third party service provider (TPSP) system [b-CEN EN 16102] in the pan-European eCall.Also, the operation of the emergency authority (EA) is out of scope of this Recommendation.
Smart parking lots (SPLs) integrate parking information to enable the coordination of parking facilities within smart cities. SPLs work with other systems to provide various parking services. This Recommendation specifies the requirements and functional architecture for SPLs. The scope of this Recommendation includes: introduction of SPLs; requirements for SPL; Functional architecture of SPL. For use cases of SPL see Appendix I. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
This Recommendation addresses a transportation safety management model that describes disaster management steps based on Internet of things (IoT) technologies in order to reduce damage from disasters. An architectural model for transportation safety services is described based on [ITU-T Y.4116] and on requirements according to the IoT reference model [ITU-T Y.4000].
The scope and characteristics of transportation disasters from various transportations (e.g., road, railway, maritime and air transportation) are based on [ITU-T Y.4116]. Transportation safety management parameters (e.g., safety index and driver tiredness) are presented respectively in Annex A and Annex B and sensing data pre-processing procedure and characteristics of transportation application services are described in the appendices of this Recommendation.
NOTE – In this Recommendation, some capabilities (e.g., driver condition monitoring, infrastructure monitoring) and some applications (e.g., road/train/maritime/air safety management services) may be related to regulation in some countries. In this case, non-functional aspects related to regulation are out of scope and functional aspects cannot supersede existing regulation. Regulatory issues may be subject to laws (e.g., intelligent transportation system (ITS) related regulation).
Cryptographic and data authentication procedures for storage devices that support length expansion, such as tape drives, are specified. Such procedures include the following cryptographic modes of operation for the AES block cipher: CCM, GCM, CBC-HMAC, and XTS-HMAC.
EME2-AES and XCB-AES wide-block encryption with associated data (EAD) modes of the NIST AES block cipher, providing usage guidelines and test vectors, are described. A wide block encryption algorithm behaves as a single block cipher with a large plaintext input and ciphertext output, but uses a narrow block cipher [in this case Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)] internally. These encryption modes are oriented toward random access storage devices that do not provide authentication, but need to reduce the granularity of a potential attack.
The functions and features to be provided in intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) to accommodate critical infrastructure protection programs are defined in this standard. Security regarding the access, operation, configuration, firmware revision and data retrieval from an IED are addressed. Communications for the purpose of power system protection (teleprotection) are not addressed in this standard.
The enhanced security management function for the protocol defined in IEEE 1888(TM), “Ubiquitous Green Community Control Network Protocol,” is described in this standard. Security requirements, system security architecture definitions, and a standardized description of authentication and authorization, along with security procedures and protocols, are specified. This standard can help avoid unintended data disclosure to the public and unauthorized access to resources, while providing enhanced integrity and confidentiality of transmitted data in the ubiquitous green community control network.
