Cybersecurity

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PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Historical Mechanisms Specification Version 2.40

The OASIS PKCS 11 Technical Committee develops enhancements to improve the PKCS #11 standard for ease of use in code libraries, open source applications, wrappers, and enterprise/COTS products: implementation guidelines, usage tutorials, test scenarios and test suites, interoperability testing, coordination of functional testing, development of conformance profiles, and providing reference implementations.

PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Current Mechanisms Specification Version 2.40

The OASIS PKCS 11 Technical Committee develops enhancements to improve the PKCS #11 standard for ease of use in code libraries, open source applications, wrappers, and enterprise/COTS products: implementation guidelines, usage tutorials, test scenarios and test suites, interoperability testing, coordination of functional testing, development of conformance profiles, and providing reference implementations.

PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Profiles Version 2.40

The OASIS PKCS 11 Technical Committee develops enhancements to improve the PKCS #11 standard for ease of use in code libraries, open source applications, wrappers, and enterprise/COTS products: implementation guidelines, usage tutorials, test scenarios and test suites, interoperability testing, coordination of functional testing, development of conformance profiles, and providing reference implementations.

PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification Version 2.40

The OASIS PKCS 11 Technical Committee develops enhancements to improve the PKCS #11 standard for ease of use in code libraries, open source applications, wrappers, and enterprise/COTS products: implementation guidelines, usage tutorials, test scenarios and test suites, interoperability testing, coordination of functional testing, development of conformance profiles, and providing reference implementations.

KMIP Additional Message Encodings v1.0

The OASIS KMIP TC works to define a single, comprehensive protocol for communication between encryption systems and a broad range of new and legacy enterprise applications, including email, databases, and storage devices. By removing redundant, incompatible key management processes, KMIP will provide better data security while at the same time reducing expenditures on multiple products.

KMIP Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Profile v1.0

The OASIS KMIP TC works to define a single, comprehensive protocol for communication between encryption systems and a broad range of new and legacy enterprise applications, including email, databases, and storage devices. By removing redundant, incompatible key management processes, KMIP will provide better data security while at the same time reducing expenditures on multiple products.

Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1

This specification defines an API enabling the creation and use of strong, attested, scoped, public key-based credentials by web applications, for the purpose of strongly authenticating users. Conceptually, one or more public key credentials, each scoped to a given WebAuthn Relying Party, are created by and bound to authenticators as requested by the web application. The user agent mediates access to authenticators and their public key credentials in order to preserve user privacy. Authenticators are responsible for ensuring that no operation is performed without user consent. Authenticators provide cryptographic proof of their properties to Relying Parties via attestation. This specification also describes the functional model for WebAuthn conformant authenticators, including their signature and attestation functionality.

High Performance Computing

‘Vanilla’ cloud environments were typically not made to handle harsh environments like that of High Performance Computing (HPC) Cloud Security. Technical concerns for HPC are further complicated by the complex and ever-evolving threat landscape. As we increasingly see cases of pure HPC bare metal infrastructure interacting with the cloud such as I/O interfaces and processes, it brings along more ‘opportunities’ for malicious attacks. While this should be considered and integrated into security policies and guidelines, performance face the perilof being compromised as precious resources are carved out for security protocols and processes. The crossing of cloud and HPC environments often leads us to questions of how security in an HPC cloud environment can be implemented, enforced and ensured without the need to compromise performance. This Working Group strives to provide recommendations that can answer these questions.