Cybersecurity/Network and Information security

This work item will analyse and define the type of OAM functions for VNFs that can be generalized and be provided as a “generic function” supporting the provisioning, connectivity, configuration and monitoring of VNFs on a virtualized platform. The work item will also determine possible solutions to realize such generic OAM functions, e.g., by leveraging PaaS capabilities. The result report will include, if necessary, recommendations for requirements and architectural enhancements. The resulting deliverable will be informative.

This Recommendation proposes security guidelines for identity management (IdM) systems. The security guidelines provide how an IdM system should be deployed and operated for secure identity services in NGN (Next Generation Network) or cyberspace environment. The security guidelines focus on providing official advice how to employ various security mechanisms to protect a general IdM system and it also provides proper security procedures required when two IdM systems are interoperated.

Recommendation ITU-T X.1043 analyses security threats to and defines security requirements for software-defined networking (SDN) based service function chaining. The corresponding security countermeasures are also given. This Recommendation aims to help understanding of security risks encountered when using the SDN-based service function chaining and implementation of secured SDN-based service function chains.

Recommendation ITU-T X.1042 supports the protection of network resources using security services based on software-defined networking (SDN). This Recommendation first classifies the network resources for SDN-based security services: SDN application, SDN controller, SDN switch and security manager (SM). Recommendation ITU-T X.1042 then defines security services based on SDN.

This work item will study multi-tenancy related use cases for NFV to remove the gap between the existing IFA010 general functional requirements on multitenancy management and the missing requirement details regarding NFV elements consumed by different tenants. It will also take into consideration possible relation with Release 3 features like multi-domain NS provisioning, security orchestration. Key issues on multi-tenancy in NFV (e.g. tenant-dependent LCM, tenant dependent resource management, traffic separation, ..) will be identified and analyzed for concluding the recommendations.

Many organizations in developing countries as well as developed countries may have difficulties in implementing the high-level dimensions described in Recommendation ITU-T X.805. Recommendation ITU-T X.1039 is aimed at providing a set of security measures to implement the high-level dimensions. It also provides technical implementation guidance for security measures that can be used to improve organizations’ security response capabilities. A set of security measures described in this Recommendation could assist organizations in managing information security risks and implementing technical dimensions. The audience of this Recommendation includes, but is not limited to, those individuals responsible for implementing an organization's information security dimensions.

Supplement 12 to ITU-T X-series Recommendations, in particular to Recommendation ITU-T X.1240, describes the basic concept and characteristics of mobile messaging spam. It also introduces and analyses current technologies on countering mobile messaging spam. In addition, this supplement proposes a general implementation framework for countering mobile messaging spam. The relative activities in different organizations are introduced in Appendix I.

The purpose of this Recommendation is to analyse, structure and suggest a method for establishing an incident management organization within a telecommunication organization involved in the provision of international telecommunications, where the flow and structure of an incident are focused. The flow and the handling are useful in determining whether an event is to be classified as an event, an incident, a security incident or a crisis. The flow also covers the critical first decisions that have to be made. Computer crime follows in the wake of the heavily increased use of computers in international telecommunications. Over the last years, computer crime has literally exploded, as confirmed by several international and national surveys. In the majority of countries, there are no exact figures on the number of computer break-ins or security incidents, especially those related to international telecommunications.Most telecommunication organizations or companies do not have any specialized organization for handling Information and Communication Networks (ICN) security incidents (although they may have a general crisis team for handling crises of any type). When an ICN security incident occurs it is handled ad hoc, i.e., the person who detects an ICN security incident takes the responsibility to handle it as best as (s)he can. In some organizations the tendency is to forget and cover up ICN security incidents as they may affect production, availability and revenues.Often, when an ICN security incident is detected, the person who detects it does not know who to report it to. This may result in the system or network's administrator deploying a workaround or quick fix just to get rid of the problem. They do not have the delegated authority, time or expertise to correct the system so that the ICN security incident does not recur. These are the main reasons why it is better to have a trained unit or group that can handle security incidents in a prompt and correct manner. Furthermore, many of the issues may be in areas as diverse as media relations, legal, law enforcement, market share, or financial.When reporting or handling an incident, the use of different taxonomies leads to misunderstanding. This may, in turn, result in an ICN security incident getting neither the proper attention, nor the prompt handling, that is needed in order to stop, contain and prevent the incident from recurring. This may lead to serious consequences for the affected organization (victim).To be able to succeed in incident handling and incident reporting, it is necessary to have an understanding of how incidents are detected, handled and resolved. By establishing a general structure for incidents (i.e., physical, administrative or organizational, and logical incidents) it is possible to obtain a general picture of the structure and flow of an incident. A uniform terminology is the base for a common understanding of words and terms.

The purpose is to define the tests to be performed in order to evaluate the performances of road applications’ GNSS-based positioning terminal (GBPT). To fully define the tests, this task will address the test strategy, the facilities to be used, the test scenarios (e.g. environments and characteristics, which shall allow the comparison of different tests), and the test procedures. The defined tests and process will be validated by performing various in-field tests. The defined tests focus essentially on accuracy, integrity and availability as required in the statement of work included in the invitation to tender. This document will benefit to: - The consolidation of EN 16803-1: "Definitions and system engineering procedures for the establishment and assessment of performances" - The elaboration of EN 16803-2: "Assessment of basic performances of GNSS-based positioning terminals" - The elaboration of EN 16803-3: "Assessment of security performances of GNSS based positioning terminals".

To realize secure, stable, efficient, and robust operations of and services by a quantum key distribution (QKD) network as well as to manage a QKD network (QKDN) as a whole and support user network management, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3804 specifies functions and procedures for QKDN control and management based on the requirements specified in Recommendation ITU-T Y.3801.

This Technical Report aims to be the entry point in relation to electronic signatures for any SME that is considering to dematerialize paper-based workflow(s) and seeks a sound legal and technical basis in order to integrate electronic signatures or electronic seals in this process. It is not intended to be a guide for SMEs active in the development of electronic signatures products and services - they should rather rely on the series ETSI EN 319 for building their offer - but it is a guide for SMEs CONSUMING e-Signature products and services. This document builds on CEN/TR 419040, "Guidelines for citizens", explaining the concept and use of electronic signatures, to further help SMEs to understand the relevance of using e-Signatures within their business processes. It guides SMEs in discovering the level of electronic Signatures which is appropriate for their needs, extends the work to specific use-case scenarios, paying special attention to technologies and solutions, and addresses other typical concrete questions that SMEs need to answer before any making any decisions (such as the question of recognition of their e-Signature by third parties, within their sector, country or even internationally).

With today’s fast-evolving threat landscape, a holistic cloud incident response framework that considers an expansive scope of factors for cloud outages is necessary. The working group aims to develop a holistic Cloud Incident Response (CIR) framework that comprehensively covers key causes of cloud incidents (both security and non-security related), and their handling and mitigation strategies. The aim is to serve as a go-to guide for cloud users to effectively prepare for and manage the aftermath of cloud incidents, and also a transparent and common framework for Cloud Service Providers to share with cloud customers their cloud incident response practices. Imperative factors of cloud incidents including, but not limited to, operational mistakes, infrastructure or system failure, environmental issues, cyber security incidents and malicious acts will be included in development of the framework.