Standard

The purpose is to define the tests to be performed in order to evaluate the performances of road applications’ GNSS-based positioning terminal (GBPT). To fully define the tests, this task will address the test strategy, the facilities to be used, the test scenarios (e.g. environments and characteristics, which shall allow the comparison of different tests), and the test procedures. The defined tests and process will be validated by performing various in-field tests. The defined tests focus essentially on accuracy, integrity and availability as required in the statement of work included in the invitation to tender. This document will benefit to: - The consolidation of EN 16803-1: "Definitions and system engineering procedures for the establishment and assessment of performances" - The elaboration of EN 16803-2: "Assessment of basic performances of GNSS-based positioning terminals" - The elaboration of EN 16803-3: "Assessment of security performances of GNSS based positioning terminals".

The purpose of this Recommendation is to analyse, structure and suggest a method for establishing an incident management organization within a telecommunication organization involved in the provision of international telecommunications, where the flow and structure of an incident are focused. The flow and the handling are useful in determining whether an event is to be classified as an event, an incident, a security incident or a crisis. The flow also covers the critical first decisions that have to be made. Computer crime follows in the wake of the heavily increased use of computers in international telecommunications. Over the last years, computer crime has literally exploded, as confirmed by several international and national surveys. In the majority of countries, there are no exact figures on the number of computer break-ins or security incidents, especially those related to international telecommunications.Most telecommunication organizations or companies do not have any specialized organization for handling Information and Communication Networks (ICN) security incidents (although they may have a general crisis team for handling crises of any type). When an ICN security incident occurs it is handled ad hoc, i.e., the person who detects an ICN security incident takes the responsibility to handle it as best as (s)he can. In some organizations the tendency is to forget and cover up ICN security incidents as they may affect production, availability and revenues.Often, when an ICN security incident is detected, the person who detects it does not know who to report it to. This may result in the system or network's administrator deploying a workaround or quick fix just to get rid of the problem. They do not have the delegated authority, time or expertise to correct the system so that the ICN security incident does not recur. These are the main reasons why it is better to have a trained unit or group that can handle security incidents in a prompt and correct manner. Furthermore, many of the issues may be in areas as diverse as media relations, legal, law enforcement, market share, or financial.When reporting or handling an incident, the use of different taxonomies leads to misunderstanding. This may, in turn, result in an ICN security incident getting neither the proper attention, nor the prompt handling, that is needed in order to stop, contain and prevent the incident from recurring. This may lead to serious consequences for the affected organization (victim).To be able to succeed in incident handling and incident reporting, it is necessary to have an understanding of how incidents are detected, handled and resolved. By establishing a general structure for incidents (i.e., physical, administrative or organizational, and logical incidents) it is possible to obtain a general picture of the structure and flow of an incident. A uniform terminology is the base for a common understanding of words and terms.

Many organizations in developing countries as well as developed countries may have difficulties in implementing the high-level dimensions described in Recommendation ITU-T X.805. Recommendation ITU-T X.1039 is aimed at providing a set of security measures to implement the high-level dimensions. It also provides technical implementation guidance for security measures that can be used to improve organizations’ security response capabilities. A set of security measures described in this Recommendation could assist organizations in managing information security risks and implementing technical dimensions. The audience of this Recommendation includes, but is not limited to, those individuals responsible for implementing an organization's information security dimensions.

Recommendation ITU-T X.1042 supports the protection of network resources using security services based on software-defined networking (SDN). This Recommendation first classifies the network resources for SDN-based security services: SDN application, SDN controller, SDN switch and security manager (SM). Recommendation ITU-T X.1042 then defines security services based on SDN.

Recommendation ITU-T X.1043 analyses security threats to and defines security requirements for software-defined networking (SDN) based service function chaining. The corresponding security countermeasures are also given. This Recommendation aims to help understanding of security risks encountered when using the SDN-based service function chaining and implementation of secured SDN-based service function chains.

This work item will study multi-tenancy related use cases for NFV to remove the gap between the existing IFA010 general functional requirements on multitenancy management and the missing requirement details regarding NFV elements consumed by different tenants. It will also take into consideration possible relation with Release 3 features like multi-domain NS provisioning, security orchestration. Key issues on multi-tenancy in NFV (e.g. tenant-dependent LCM, tenant dependent resource management, traffic separation, ..) will be identified and analyzed for concluding the recommendations.

This work item will analyse and define the type of OAM functions for VNFs that can be generalized and be provided as a “generic function” supporting the provisioning, connectivity, configuration and monitoring of VNFs on a virtualized platform. The work item will also determine possible solutions to realize such generic OAM functions, e.g., by leveraging PaaS capabilities. The result report will include, if necessary, recommendations for requirements and architectural enhancements. The resulting deliverable will be informative.

This document provides a standardized IoT Reference Architecture using a common vocabulary, reusable designs and industry best practices. It uses a top down approach, beginning with collecting the most important characteristics of IoT, abstracting those into a generic IoT Conceptual Model, deriving a high level system based reference with subsequent dissection of that model into the four architecture views (functional view, system view, networking view and usage view) from different perspectives.

The standard provides guidelines for the security standards of organizational information and information security management practices, including the selection, implementation and management of controls, taking into account the risk environment for the security of the organisation information.

The standard defines the specific guidelines for the management of digital data which are the identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence that can be of probative value. This standard provides guidance to individuals regarding common situations encountered during the processing of digital data and assists organizations in their disciplinary procedures and in facilitating the exchange of potential digital evidence between jurisdictions.

The standard provides a guideline on the mechanisms to ensure that the methods and processes used in the investigation of information security incidents are "fit for purpose". It contains the best practices regarding the definition of the requirements, the description of the methods, and demonstration of how the implementation of the methods can satisfy the requests. It also includes considerations on how vendors and third parties can be used to help this warranty process.