IEC 62832-2:2020 specifies detailed requirements for model elements of the Digital Factory framework. It defines the nature of the information provided by the model elements, but not the format of this information.
IEC 61987-16:2016 provides an<br /> - operating list of properties (OLOP) for the description of the operating parameters and the collection of requirements for a density measuring equipment, and<br /> - device lists of properties (DLOP) for a range of density measuring equipment types describing them.<br /> The structures of the OLOP and the DLOP correspond with the general structures defined in IEC 61987-11 and agree with the fundamentals for the construction of LOPs defined in IEC 61987-10.
This document presents a Secure Device Identifier (DevID), an ID cryptographically bound to a device and supports authentication of the device's identity. An Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) provided by the supplier of a device can be supplemented by Local Device Identifiers (LDevIDs) facilitating enrollment (provisioning of authentication and authorization credentials) by local network administrators.
This draft Recommendation analyses the potential deployment scheme and typical application scenarios of edge computing services, specifies the security threats and requirements specific to the edge computing services and thus establishes the security framework for the operator to safeguard its applications.
5G EC would play a key role on low latency services and traffic off-load services in 5G era. Several prominent factors would enlarge and complex the security risks to the network layer that supports 5G EC and even bring new security challenges to the network security operation. These factors would be the flexible network architectures of 5G, the variable deployment positions of EC, the various application scenarios, different types of users' private networks and access networks, etc. The boundaries among the telecommunication networks and the private networks would be more ambiguous, and the exposure surface would be expanded. Therefore, the security requirements and measures of the network layer including both of the telecommunication networks and the private networks would be recommended as telecommunication operators enjoying the benefit of EC.
Edge computing is strongly related to 5G and UPF is the data connection point between the MEC system and 5G Network architecture. The sinking of 5G network user plane brings threats such as illegal eavesdropping, which may seriously threaten the data security in edge computing. The edge node has unique features itself and whether in the physical environment or the network, the data security will be an important problem that the edge nodes need to face. Therefore, the recommendation analyses the edge computing data security mainly from these two aspects and provides relative data security challenges and threats and data security guidelines for Edge Computing. This recommendation could help to address the data security issues in Edge Computing implementation
IEC 62443-2-4:2015 specifies requirements for security capabilities for IACS service providers that they can offer to the asset owner during integration and maintenance activities of an Automation Solution. The contents of the corrigendum of August 2015 have been included in this copy.
IEC 62443-3-2:2020 establishes requirements for: a) defining a system under consideration (SUC) for an industrial automation and control system (IACS); b) partitioning the SUC into zones and conduits; c) assessing risk for each zone and conduit; d) establishing the target security level (SL-T) for each zone and conduit; and e) documenting the security requirements.
IEC 62443-3-3:2013 provides detailed technical control system requirements (SRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs) described in IEC 62443-1-1 including defining the requirements for control system capability security levels, SL-C(control system). These requirements would be used by various members of the industrial automation and control system (IACS) community along with the defined zones and conduits for the system under consideration (SuC) while developing the appropriate control system target SL, SL-T(control system), for a specific asset. The contents of the corrigendum of April 2014 have been included in this copy.
IEC TR 62443-2-3:2015(E) describes requirements for asset owners and industrial automation and control system (IACS) product suppliers that have established and are now maintaining an IACS patch management program. This Technical Report recommends a defined format for the distribution of information about security patches from asset owners to IACS product suppliers, a definition of some of the activities associated with the development of the patch information by IACS product suppliers and deployment and installation of the patches by asset owners. The exchange format and activities are defined for use in security related patches; however, it may also be applicable for non-security related patches or updates.
This document provides a standardized generic Digital Twin maturity model, definition of assessment indicators, guidance for a maturity assessment, and other practical classifications of Digital Twin capabilities, etc.
This document establishes terminology for Digital Twin (DT) and describes concepts in the field of Digital Twin, including the terms and definitions of Digital Twin, concepts of Digital Twin (e.g., Digital Twin ecosystem, lifecycle process for Digital Twin, and classifications of Digital Twin), Functional view of Digital Twin and Digital Twin stakeholders.