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ITU-T Y.3800

Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800 specifies an overview on networks supporting quantum key distribution (QKD).

This Recommendation aims to provide support for design, deployment, operation and maintenance to implement QKD networks (QKDNs) in terms of standardized technologies.

The relevant network aspects for conceptual structure, layered model and basic functions are within the scope of the Recommendation to support its implementation.

Y.3800 (Recommendation)

Security considerations for quantum key distribution networks

This Technical Report provides security considerations for quantum key distribution (QKD) network. It describes the following:

  • Introduction to the QKD network (QKDN);
  • Security considerations in communications between the QKD systems and (cryptographic) applications;
  • Security considerations in communications between QKD systems and management (and monitoring) systems; and
  • Standardization issues and suggestions for future works.
XSTR-SEC-QKD (Technical Report)

ITU-T X.1710

Recommendation ITU-T X.1710 specifies a framework including requirements and measures to combat security threats for quantum key distribution networks (QKDNs).

It specifies a simplified QKDN structure for analysis of the relevant security threats. Security requirements and corresponding security measures are then specified on that basis.

X.1710 (Recommendation)

ETSI TR 103 570 V1.1.1

The present document compares a selection of proposals for quantum-safe key exchanges taken from the academic literature. In particular, it includes key exchanges based on the Learning with Errors (LWE), Ring-LWE and Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) problems, as well as key exchanges constructed from the Niederreiter and NTRU key transport schemes.

The present document gives an overview of each key exchange, lists proposed parameters and gives software performance estimates on a range of processors. It also discusses various security and implementation considerations such as active attacks and side-channel vulnerabilities.

TR 103 570 (Technical Report)

ETSI GS QKD 015 V1.1.1

The present document provides a definition of management interfaces for the integration of QKD in disaggregated network control plane architectures, in particular with Software-Defined Networking (SDN). It defines abstraction models and workflows between a SDN-enabled QKD node and the SDN controller, including resource discovery, capabilities dissemination and system configuration operations. Application layer interfaces and quantum-channel interfaces are out of scope.

GS QKD 015

ETSI GS QKD 012 V1.1.1

The present document describes the main communication resources involved in a QKD system and the possible architectures that can be adopted when performing a QKD deployment over an optical network infrastructure. The scope of the present document is restricted to QKD deployments over fibre optical networks. Architectural options are also restricted to point-to-point communication.

GS QKD 012

ETSI GS QKD 011 V1.1.1

The present document gives specifications and procedures for the characterization of optical components for use in QKD systems. Examples of specific tests and procedures for performing such tests are given. Due to their importance in the security of a QKD system, particular attention is given to active optical components such as optical sources and single photon detectors.

GS QKD 011

ETSI GS QKD 008 V1.1.1

The present document aims to establish the necessary requirements for a QKD module to have a high probability of detecting and responding precisely and timely to attempts of direct physical access, and use or modification of modules inside. The principal objective is to detect any possible penetration with high probability, and resulting in the immediate zeroization of all Critical Security Parameters in plain text.

GS QKD 008 (Group Specification)

ETSI GS QKD 005 V1.1.1

Quantum key distribution (QKD) comprises technologies that use quantum mechanical effects to distribute private keys to distant partners. The goals of the present document are as follows:

  • to make precise the nature of the security claim, including its statistical component;
  • to list meaningful restrictions of adversarial action;
  • to clarify the difference between security claim of a protocol (based on models) and the security claim of its implementation;
  • to carefully list all the usual components of a QKD protocol with their critical characterizations.
GS QKD 005