How all or part of a network can be secured transparently to peer protocol entities that use the MAC Service provided by IEEE 802 LANs to communicate is specified in this standard. MAC security (MACsec) provides connectionless user data confidentiality, frame data integrity, and data origin authenticity.
This standard specifies the operation of Bridge Port Extenders, including management, protocols, and algorithms. Bridge Port Extenders operate in support of the MAC Service by Extended Bridges.
Profiles that select features, options, configurations, defaults, protocols and procedures of bridges, stations and LANs that are necessary to build networks that are capable of transporting time-sensitive audio and/or video data streams are defined in this standard.
ISO 20140-5:2017 specifies the types of environmental performance evaluation (EPE) data, including their attributes, which can be used for evaluating the environmental performance of manufacturing systems based on the general principles described in ISO 20140_1. It also provides recommendations for mapping the EPE data on to information models specified by IEC 62264. ISO 20140-5:2017 applies to discrete, batch and continuous manufacturing. ISO 20140-5:2017 is applicable to entire manufacturing facilities and to parts of a manufacturing facility. ISO 20140-5:2017 specifically excludes from its scope the syntax of the data and information models, the protocols to exchange data models, the functions that can be enabled by data models, and the activities in Level 1 and Level 2. The scope of ISO 20140-5:2017 also includes indicating the differences among various data and information models and the differences among various representations of environmental performance by actual data. ISO 20140-5:2017 refers to the semantics of the structured data and information models used by communication protocols. The semantics explain the meaning of the attributes and of the context information. The following are outside the scope of ISO 20140-5:2017: a) product life cycle assessment; b) EPE data that are specific to a particular industry sector, manufacturer or machinery; c) acquisition of data; d) the activity of data communication.
IEC 62541-5:2020 which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition. IEC 62541-5:2020 defines the Information Model of the OPC Unified Architecture. The Information Model describes standardized Nodes of a Server's AddressSpace. These Nodes are standardized types as well as standardized instances used for diagnostics or as entry points to server-specific Nodes. Thus, the Information Model defines the AddressSpace of an empty OPC UA Server. However, it is not expected that all Servers will provide all of these Nodes. This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2015. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) Added Annex F on User Authentication. Describes the Role Information Model that also allows configuration of Roles. b) Added new data types: "Union", "Decimal", "OptionSet", "DateString", "TimeString", "DurationString", NormalizedString", "DecimalString", and "AudioDataType". c) Added Method to request a state change in a Server. d) Added Method to set Subscription to persistent mode. e) Added Method to request resending of data from a Subscription. f) Added concept allowing to temporarily create a file to write to or read from a server in C.4. g) Added new Variable type to support Selection Lists. h) Added optional properties to FiniteStateMachineType to expose currently available states and transitions. i) Added UrisVersion Property to ServerType. This version information can be used for session-less service invocation.
IEC 62714-3:2017 specifies the integration of geometry and kinematics information for the exchange between engineering tools in the plant automation area by means of AML.
IEC 62443-4-2:2019 provides detailed technical control system component requirements (CRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs) described in IEC TS 62443-1-1 including defining the requirements for control system capability security levels and their components, SL-C (component). As defined in IEC TS 62443-1-1 there are a total of seven foundational requirements (FRs): a) identification and authentication control (IAC), b) use control (UC), c) system integrity (SI), d) data confidentiality (DC), e) restricted data flow (RDF), f) timely response to events (TRE), and g) resource availability (RA). These seven FRs are the foundation for defining control system security capability levels. Defining security capability levels for the control system component is the goal and objective of this document as opposed to SL-T or achieved SLs (SL-A), which are out of scope. Show less
IEC 62832-2:2020 specifies detailed requirements for model elements of the Digital Factory framework. It defines the nature of the information provided by the model elements, but not the format of this information.
IEC 61987-16:2016 provides an<br /> - operating list of properties (OLOP) for the description of the operating parameters and the collection of requirements for a density measuring equipment, and<br /> - device lists of properties (DLOP) for a range of density measuring equipment types describing them.<br /> The structures of the OLOP and the DLOP correspond with the general structures defined in IEC 61987-11 and agree with the fundamentals for the construction of LOPs defined in IEC 61987-10.
This document presents a Secure Device Identifier (DevID), an ID cryptographically bound to a device and supports authentication of the device's identity. An Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) provided by the supplier of a device can be supplemented by Local Device Identifiers (LDevIDs) facilitating enrollment (provisioning of authentication and authorization credentials) by local network administrators.
This draft Recommendation analyses the potential deployment scheme and typical application scenarios of edge computing services, specifies the security threats and requirements specific to the edge computing services and thus establishes the security framework for the operator to safeguard its applications.
5G EC would play a key role on low latency services and traffic off-load services in 5G era. Several prominent factors would enlarge and complex the security risks to the network layer that supports 5G EC and even bring new security challenges to the network security operation. These factors would be the flexible network architectures of 5G, the variable deployment positions of EC, the various application scenarios, different types of users' private networks and access networks, etc. The boundaries among the telecommunication networks and the private networks would be more ambiguous, and the exposure surface would be expanded. Therefore, the security requirements and measures of the network layer including both of the telecommunication networks and the private networks would be recommended as telecommunication operators enjoying the benefit of EC.
